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Method, Community & Comparative
Law: An Encounter With Complexity
Science
David J. Gerber1
Assume that you are attending a symposium on
comparative law being held in conjunction with the annual
meeting of the American Society for Comparative Law.
Comparative law scholars from many universities are present,
and a few legal practitioners are attending as well.2 One speaker
begins as follows: "This talk will be about complex adaptive
systems - the emerging science of complexity." Based on
experience in similar contexts, I would anticipate several common
reactions among members of the audience. The most common
might be "he's in the wrong room." Another set of reactions is
likely to be "What? What's that? Never heard of it!" A third
might be "What possible relevance can that have for comparative
law?" Beneath these specific responses - and less likely to be
expressed - is an assumption that this type of scientific discussion
is alien and potentially inimical to the world of comparative law.
The "scientific" language of the subject is likely to seem foreign to
many, and the idea of a tie to comparative law is often perceived
as not only foreign, but also perhaps threatening.3
I use this imagined scenario as a window into the topic of the
symposium: methodological approaches to comparative law. It
1. Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago Kent College of Law.
Copyright, David J. Gerber, 2010.
2. This essay is adapted from a talk given at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of Comparative Law, October, 2009, at Roger Williams
University School of Law in Bristol, Rhode Island.
3. This hypothetical situation is based, in part, on my experience at the
previously referenced conference.
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provides a perspective on thinking about comparative law
methods and a means of locating those methods in relation to
other potentially relevant academic pursuits. The reactions to
which I refer reveal much about comparative law at the outset of
the twenty-first century. 4
As we shall see, the issue of comparative law's methods (or
lack thereof) plays an important role in this analysis. Methods
typically shape and define the agenda of academic and other
knowledge communities. They provide a common reference point
for members of the community, and they represent an important
source of professional identity for individuals within those
communities. An individual who writes about economic issues, for
example, cannot today be considered an "economist" unless s/he
utilizes a set of methodological reference points referred to as neo-
classical economics. There may be significant variations in the use
of these tools and in the assumptions made in applying them, and
there are degrees and varieties of methodological constraints.
Despite these variations, this methodological core is central to the
identity of members of the profession. Discussions of method can
be overblown, overdone and vacuous, but they also can shape the
product of a knowledge community, relations among community
members, and their ties to other intellectual communities.
Comparative law does not have a well developed set of core
methodological propositions, and this has important implications
for each of these domains - its relevance, its interaction with other
intellectual communities, and, ultimately, the work it produces. A
scholar who considers her work "comparative" or considers herself
"a comparatist" has reason to be concerned about the minimalist
content of those terms.
It is important to emphasize the narrow focus of these
comments on comparative law and complexity science. I do not
claim here that comparative law should follow complexity science
or any science for that matter. Nor do I suggest that comparative
law scholars need to study complexity theory, although many
might gain insights from such study. I also do not argue that
complexity science is necessarily directly relevant to specific
comparative law issues. My concern here is with the relationship
4. I refer here specifically to the situation in the United States, but the
situation is similar in many other comparative law communities.
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between comparative law and other academic disciplines, in
particular, the discourses of science. Finally, I do not claim any
level of expertise in complexity science. I use it here for the sole
purpose of providing insights into comparative law.
This essay looks briefly at complexity science in order to set
the stage for more analytical comments about its potential
relevance to comparative law. It identifies some forms of value
that comparative law may derive from complexity science and
probes why there has been virtually no interest in this field among
comparative law scholars and why mention of the topic alone
tends to elicit negative or, at least, distancing reactions. I then
note some of the potential implications of this indifference and,
perhaps, "angst."
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COMPLEXITY SCIENCE
Why do I use complexity science (more accurately, the science
of complex adaptive systems) for this exercise? First, it is a
relatively new scientific field that has taken shape over the last
few decades and that has only begun to generate widespread
attention during the last decade or two. 5 This allows us to focus
on a brief time frame. It also reduces potential research "noise"
from past experience or from claims that elements of complexity
science might have osmosed into the thinking of comparative law
over a period of years. Second, complexity science has similar
subject matter and similar objectives to those of comparative law,
for example, both seek to understand systems, their operations
and their consequences. Complexity science studies systems in
general, while comparative law deals with a specific type of
system - namely, legal systems. Third, both are "tool" endeavors.
They are not limited to the substantive outcomes of a particular
system, but seek to understand commonalities and differences
among and between systems. Just as complexity theory can be
applied to biology, economics or any other area of the social or
natural worlds, so too, comparative law is understood as
applicable to comparisons among legal systems or components of
legal systems of any kind.
5. For introductory discussions, see, e.g., JOHN H. MILLER & ScoiT E.
PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS (2007); see also, MELANIE MITCHELL,
COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TouR (2009).
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Given these similarities, one might expect comparative law
scholars to take a lively interest in complexity science. In seeking
to understand why they not only fail to take interest, but also tend
to react with indifference or even hostility to suggestions that
complexity science may be relevant to what they do, we need first
to look at complexity science, searching for clues as to why it is
perceived as alien to the world of comparative law.
Complexity science has developed primarily since the 1980s,
although it has identifiable roots in the preceding decades. In the
early stages of its development, scholars trained in game theory
and mathematics were often in the forefront of development.
Typically, these analysts had early access to and familiarity with
computers, and they began to recognize that computers could be
used to analyze systems in ways that were impossible without
such computing tools. It is important to emphasize, however, that
from the beginning scholars in other fields (primarily in the social
sciences) recognized the potential value of analyzing systems with
these kinds of cross disciplinary tools.
As the discipline has grown in importance, it has also become
increasingly interdisciplinary in emphasis. Although leading
figures in the field still typically have backgrounds in
mathematics or game theory, the scope of the field has expanded,
and this type of training is not a prerequisite for playing a
significant role in it. Scholars in the field emphasize that it is and
must remain an interdisciplinary field that includes and analyzes
input from scholars in many fields. The methodology of
complexity theory has been applied in "hard" sciences such as
biology and chemistry, but also in the social sciences, most
prominently among economists, sociologists and political
scientists. The Santa Fe Institute6 has been the prime "think
tank" for this new area of science.
The research subject in the field is systems. Specifically, it is
a particular kind of system known as a complex adaptive system
(or "complex system"). Such systems have four basic
characteristics. 7  First, the components must be diverse. If all
6. SANTA FE INSTITUTE, http://www.santafe.edu (last visited Nov. 10,
2010).
7. The terms and frameworks of complexity science are not as firmly
established as they tend to be in more traditional areas of science.
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identified components of the system are the same - for example, if
all are buyers - it cannot be a complex system. Second, the
components must be interconnected in that they must be related
to each other in space or in some other definable medium. Third,
the components must be interdependent in the sense that the
actions of one component of the system will have potential
consequences for other components of the system. Finally, in a
complex system, each component reacts or may react to any or all
of the other components of the system
Complexity science reveals that systems often have common
properties and exhibit common patterns in the interactions among
their components and in the consequences these interactions
produce (referred to as "emergent properties"). These can be
studied, and principles can be derived that apply to all (or most)
such systems. In this sense, it is basic science - i.e., a science that
studies principles that can be universally or at least widely
applied.
Complexity analysts find complex systems virtually
everywhere. For example, a pond constitutes a complex system.
It has diverse elements; they are related to each other -
principally by physical proximity and the water of the pond; they
are interdependent in the sense that actions of one component can
influence all other components; and each can react to the actions
of others. Other examples of complex adaptive systems that have
been studied include chemical interactions, traffic grids, markets,
and families. Legal systems could also be added to the list.
Developments that can roughly be subsumed under the label
of "globalization" exponentially increase the complexity and scope
of systemic interactions and the importance of understanding how
they work and the properties they generate. As communication
becomes more rapid and transportation becomes more accessible
and effective, for example, the impact of developments in one part
of the world increasingly cause effects in widely disparate
communities and locations that become part of global or regional
systems.
Complexity analysts claim that traditional scientific methods
are inadequate to deal with these interactions, largely because
they were developed to achieve other objectives and with other
tools. The new science is, in contrast, specifically designed to deal
with these issues, and it uses previously unavailable technology -
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i.e., advanced computer capabilities - to identify patterns of
operation within systems and the "properties" produced by them.
The basic method used in complexity science is called "agent-
based modeling." It is a computational method that requires
appropriate computing resources. In its most basic form, the
analyst identifies the components of a system and assigns each a
set of so-called "rules." These are modeling devices that identify
specific characteristics of the system components so that
interactions within the system can be isolated and more effectively
studied and analyzed. To use an oversimplified example, the
analyst may identify several types of possible reactions of one or
more of a system's components (e.g., one species of fish in a pond
or one type of seller in a market) to changes in the condition,
position or conduct of one of the other components of the system
(e.g., changes in the availability of a plant eaten by the fish in
question or changes in the insurability of risks of other potential
sellers in the designated market). Using these "rules," computer
simulations can then reveal patterns of interaction among system
components. This can identify unanticipated and perhaps distant
interactions that other forms of analysis could not identify, and it
can isolate "emergent properties" of the system - i.e., outcomes
produced by these interactions.
Applying these tools calls for identifying the dimensions of the
system, including its borders and components. The analyst must
identify the characteristics of the components and assess the
degree of diversity within the system. It is then necessary to
apply or develop appropriate measures of connectedness - how are
the components situated in relation to each other? A further step
is to identify the interactions among the components. Finally, the
analyst seeks to identify the "emergent properties" of the system.
All of this is to be done in as precise a manner as possible, so that
hypotheses can be further tested and results shared and
evaluated.
The rapid progress of complexity science in university
faculties in recent years attests to its perceived potential value in
many areas. There are now departments of complexity science in
dozens of universities, and there are numerous journals devoted
entirely or primarily to the field.8 A priori at least, this kind of
8. See COMPLEXITY DIGEST, http://comdig.unam.mx (last visited Nov. 5,
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analysis of systems could be of significant value in analyzing legal
systems and their interactions with other systems and other
players.
II. POTENTIAL VALUE FOR COMPARATIVE LAW
What value might complexity science offer for comparative
law? I do not here explore this question in depth, leaving that
perhaps for another time. My objective is merely to sketch areas
of some potential value, not to persuade comparative law scholars
that such potential value can be realized or to demonstrate how it
can be realized. If the potential value is identifiable and appears
to be reasonably accessible, one would expect there to be at least
some interest among those who consider themselves to be doing
comparative law.
The potential value of complexity science for comparative law
scholars derives from the fact that the primary subject matter of
both is systems and that both ask the same basic questions about
systems. 9 Both ask what the elements of systems are, how they
work, what results they produce and how they relate to other
systems. Complexity science trains its attention on systems in
general; comparative law deals with a particular kind of complex
system - namely, legal systems. Whatever principles can be
identified as applicable to systems in general can be expected to be
applicable to legal systems. This hypothesis can then be tested.
Where principles applicable to other systems appear inapplicable
to a legal system (or systems) the differences can be evaluated.
Why are they different? In what ways are they different? What
are the consequences that are likely to flow from such differences?
Answering these questions can produce valuable insight into legal
2010); see also Chaos and Complexity Systems Seminar, UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN-MADISON, http://sprott.physics.wisc.edu/chaos-Complexity (last
visited Dec. 28, 2010). More than thirty academic institutions have
complexity science departments or groups, and there are at least five
independent organizations that are dedicated entirely to complexity science.
In addition, at least nineteen academic journals are dedicated in whole or in
part to complexity science research.
9. Some comparative law scholars might object, claiming that the work
that they do focuses not on systems as such, but on specific problems or
specific issues. Those specific issues and problems become "comparative,"
however, only when there is comparison across systems. Thus issues of
system are implicit in any such endeavor.
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systems.
A. Potential Benefits for the Quality and Content of Comparative
Legal Analysis
More specifically, complexity analysis may provide value by
enriching the methodological language and perspectives of
comparative law and thus the products of comparative analysis.
Complexity science is developing ways of understanding systemic
relationships and interactions that may provide new and valuable
perspectives on legal comparison. At the very least it can expand
the conceptual and analytical tools available to comparative law
scholars. For example, complexity analysis identifies measures of
difference and distance among elements of a system that may be
useful - perhaps in modified form - in comparing legal systems.
Rooted in the sciences, this language seeks precision and
transferability. It strives to develop concepts with relatively
sharp definitions and edges. This allows the science to develop as
a process of interaction among scholars and other users, as each
uses and refines the language. Such efforts to develop and apply
conceptually precise and transferable language are rare in
comparative law, contributing to its perceived opacity and to the
"ad hoc" character of much comparative law scholarship. It also
means, however, that comparative law scholars are not likely to
simply accept the language of complexity science. Moreover, they
should not. Their subject matter has specific features of its own,
and their audiences and incentives differ from those of many in
the natural and social sciences. Nevertheless, the language
provides potential reference points that might be adapted for use
in comparative law.
B. Potential Benefits for Comparative Law's Relevance
Complexity science may also have value for the relevance of
comparative law - in particular, for its relationships to other
academic communities and projects. To the extent that it provides
or encourages comparative law specialists to develop a more
identifiable framework for analysis and research, it can be
expected to enhance the potential value of comparative law to
others who may be interested in legal phenomena, but who have
difficulty knowing what the language and reference points of
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comparative law scholarship are. Similarly, to the extent that
comparative law uses a language and a set of concepts that are
transferable to other social domains, comparative law research
can be more easily understood and used by scholars who use
similar language. For example, complexity science can provide a
bridge to those in the social sciences who are engaged in empirical
research. It could, for example, provide a format for empirical
research that would be directed specifically at the analysis of legal
systems. Comparative law scholars could use it to access
empirical research in other areas, and scholars in other knowledge
fields could use it to identify and comprehend comparative law
research and perhaps relate their own work to it.
Finally, complexity science provides a point of comparative
reference for the efforts of comparative law itself. It can give
comparative law scholars insight into what they do by allowing
comparisons with others who operate in a related field with
similar objectives. A central claim in comparative law is that the
act of comparison itself provides value by providing perspective on
what each legal system does and raising questions about why it
does them. This claim can be applied to comparative law
scholarship itself.10 It provides a comparative vantage point. To
what extent do the perspectives and methods of complexity science
relating to systems differ from the perspectives and methods
applied in comparative law? What can be gained from similarities
or differences in each approach?
III. REACTIONS: DISTANCE, INDIFFERENCE AND
METHODOLOGICAL ANGST
Despite these elements of potential value, comparative law
scholars have shown almost no awareness of or interest in
complexity science. In fact, they have basically ignored it.
Moreover, as noted at the outset, encounters both experienced and
imagined feature reactions of distance, indifference and something
akin to hostility. Given that complexity science is now well
established in many universities and regularly produces books
10. The point here is not that comparatists do not think about these
issues. Some certainly do. Typically, however, they do not do so in ways that
are shared and that thus promote an ongoing process of refinement of the
methods.
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and articles, this lack of attention may suggest that comparative
law scholars have not perceived significant incentives to seek new
perspectives on or improvement in their methods. If they had,
such concerns would naturally lead to at least preliminary
interest in complexity science. Perhaps the crux of the situation is
captured in the question: "How can one think about improving a
method if there is no method to improve?" We will return a bit
later to this possibility.
A. Some explanations: Isolation as Sub-text
This lack of interest and these reactions of hostility are rooted
in the history of comparative law scholarship in the United States,
and we can identify some of the factors that have shaped them.
They are also part of a larger set of issues - the role and identity
of comparative law. In that experience, comparative law methods
and the comparative law community have been largely isolated
from other forms of academic endeavor. Moreover, scholars of
comparative law in the United States since the Second World War
have seldom shown sustained interest in developing a common
methodological discourse. 11
Comparative law as a discipline has also made limited efforts
to contribute to academic developments in other areas, and
scholars in other academic disciplines have generally paid little
attention to comparative law scholarship as a discipline. In
general, they tend to view "comparative law" as a loose
designation to be applied to scholars who in some way write about
foreign legal systems. Many years of reviewing manuscripts for
the American Journal of Comparative Law have made clear to me
that most authors submitting manuscripts have little idea of what
comparative scholarship is. Any writing dealing with a foreign
legal system may be labeled "comparative law" - regardless of
whether it actually relates to more than one system, whether it
actually compares, or whether it engages in any type of trans-
system analysis.
11. There are, of course, exceptions. For an excellent analysis of some of
these issues, see Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law
in the Era of Information, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 221 (1999).
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B. The Tasks and Trajectories of Comparative Law
In part, this isolation has been due to the objectives which
comparative law scholars have identified. For decades after the
Second World War, practice-oriented objectives dominated the
agendas of most comparative law scholars.12 For example, they
often had strong incentives to deal with issues related to
transnational contracts. This typically meant looking at
differences in the formal characteristics of specific legal areas.
They answered questions such as "What language should we
include in the contract?" "What law would be applicable to the
contract if it were evaluated in a foreign or domestic court?" And,
"What is the content of the law that might be applicable to this
contract?" These were practitioners' questions, but few during
those decades had the linguistic and other skills or the
communication and research tools necessary to answer them. The
task thus often fell to comparative law scholars. Similar tasks
arose in the context of international arbitration and in other
areas.
Where comparative law scholars treated policy questions,
they tended to respond to questions posed by government
initiatives. A legislature might ask, "Should we change our law to
conform more closely to a foreign law? Or "Is the solution
provided by law "A" better than our solution?" Sometimes there
have also been international projects that have called for
comparative law scholars to identify differences and similarities
among systems in order to move toward greater harmonization of
laws, but relatively few comparatists have been engaged in such
projects.
In addition to the incentive structure that shaped the
personal agendas of comparative law scholars, the nature of the
task itself has generally been understood as highly "ad hoc."
Individual research projects have seldom been viewed in relation
to systemic issues that require a deeper and more sustained
analysis of their relationships to other problems or to other
characteristics of the legal system involved. At least there is little
12. I have treated some of these issues elsewhere, see, e.g., David J.
Gerber, System Dynamics: Toward a Language of Comparative Law, 46 AM.
J. COMP. L. 719-37 (1998). See generally, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAw (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006).
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evidence that scholars have perceived significant incentives to
view their task in terms of systematically identifying cause-effect
relationships within and among systems.
More fundamentally, the comparative law task has been seen
as one of individual knowledge-heroics - i.e., events in which a
single scholar with a particular linguistic facility and perhaps also
rare access to certain foreign materials has been asked to
overcome linguistic and access hurdles in order to carry out a
"mission." From this perspective, acquiring this language facility
and this level of access is "hard enough" - why should they also
try to tie their heroics to grander themes? This kind of analysis
was not likely to call for systematic analysis or consideration of
larger issues of method.
C. Globalization's Opportunities
These and other factors have shaped the evolution of
comparative law, and they help to explain attitudes common in
comparative law. However, one might expect the situation to have
changed as a result of the many forms of globalization - economic,
communication, transportation, etc. - that have emerged with
such prominence during the last two decades. These enhance the
potential value of comparative law and the opportunities for
comparative law to expand its horizons to deal with those methods
and forms of knowledge that are relevant to the changing global
legal environment. In other words, these changes might have
been expected to alter the sense of methodological isolation of
comparative law as a discipline. There is, however, relatively
little evidence that a major change or re-evaluation is underway
or that much has changed in the relationship between
comparative law and other academic disciplines.
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF DISTANCE
These attitudes and reactions among comparative law
scholars to the new field of complexity science and their general
hostility to the very idea that it could be relevant to comparative
law appear to reflect a widely-held and deeply rooted view among
comparative law scholars of their own field. It is one in which
comparative law as a discipline is largely isolated from other
intellectual endeavors. This image of isolation may have
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significant implications for comparative law's roles, opportunities,
and even potential value.
One obvious impact is on the perceived relevance of
comparative law as a discipline. It is today largely unnoticed
(even invisible) as a discipline. Few ask questions such as "what
does comparative law say about this?" In most recognized
disciplines, non-members have some general sense of the kinds of
questions that the field addresses. As a result, they know that if
they want a particular perspective or a particular kind of data,
they can expect to find it among the members of the discipline. I
have seen little evidence of that in relation to comparative law.
One example is the discussion of corporation law in United
States law schools. Since the 1990s, there has been an ongoing
debate about differences in corporation law between the United
States, Europe, and Japan.13 Comparative law scholars have
played almost no role in the debate! Essentially, scholars of
corporation law and of law and economics have juxtaposed legal
systems, developed claims based on limited and sometimes value-
laden analysis, and called it "comparative law." There is little
evidence that the corporate law scholars engaged in the debate
even considered the possibility that scholars of comparative law
might have something to contribute using the tools of the
discipline. This should be astonishing, but, given what we know
about comparative law at this point, it is not.
This perceived distance from other disciplines also tends to
constrain and limit the perspectives and horizons of comparative
law scholarship, and it may thereby limit the richness, quality,
and potential value of that scholarship. Intellectual impulses
from other fields can lead comparative law scholars to think about
issues they may not have otherwise considered and introduce
them to potentially valuable tools that they may not have used.
External sources can enrich the vocabulary and methods of
comparative law and thus improve the products of the
comparative law community. Individual scholars have pursued
these advantages effectively, and they have often gained much as
a result of them, but these advantages and insights have seldom
13. The literature here is voluminous. For a valuable overview of the
issues, see, e.g., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERSITY (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002).
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been incorporated in any shared methodological discussion that
could make them valuable to comparative law as a discipline.
The above comments obviously are not meant to suggest that
individual scholars who specialize in comparative law issues are
unimportant or that their work is ignored. Many scholars are
very prominent in their fields, and their comparative law
backgrounds often give them insights that others often do not
have. The issue is rather that comparative law as a discipline or
field of study does not have more than a flimsy and uncertain
identity. Individual scholars may be important, but not as
comparative law scholars. In part, this can be attributed to the
lack of a central methodological discussion. At present, each
comparative law analyst is basically left to find elements of
comparison and analytical reference points on his or her own.
There is no ongoing discussion of available intellectual tools and
experiences that could serve as a basis for sharing research
experience and results. Without such a framework for sharing,
there are few opportunities to enhance the analytical power of
comparative legal analysis and thus motivate, enrich, and sustain
individual research efforts.
V. RELATING AND RELEVANCE: METHOD AS A BRIDGE
The lack of a central methodological framework or discussion
contributes to this distance in important ways. It tends to inhibit
intellectual and professional ties to comparative law as a
discipline. There have, of course, been discussions of methods in
the comparative law literature, and many have been filled with
insights of great value. My point here is more specific. It relates
to the lack of a central and widely-accepted set of reference points
for those discussions. There is no central methodology and no
methodological discussion that can give structure to the discourse
among comparative law scholars. There is thus little discipline-
defining discussion and no real discipline in the sense of a body of
scholarship defined by shared methodological propositions.
A. Method and Community
This is not the place to explore in depth the relationship
between method and the operations of scholarly or other
intellectual communities. The fact that there is an extensive
123
124 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:110
literature on the issue suggests its widespread importance. We
can, however, identify potentially relevant elements of the
relationship that can then be applied to the context of comparative
law. First, most intellectual communities are defined in some
sense by methodological issues. Such a discussion of method has
often been critical to the success of the community in the academic
world and beyond. One need only refer to the role of economics in
law and public policy over the last three decades to glimpse the
enormous capacity of a central methodological framework to
advance the interests of an academic community.14
Methods perform two basic functions. One is internal to the
community. It shapes the relationships among members of the
community. It gives guidance in the training of new scholars in
the field. It relates members of the community to each other,
gives them points of reference for discussing work in the field,
disseminates information and insights into how issues common to
their shared endeavor have previously been handled, and
transmits information about the consequences of previous
applications of particular approaches to problems. In virtually all
cases of which I am aware, the development of a central
methodological discussion has tended to concentrate scholarly
efforts and establish clearer lines of communication among
scholars within the field. In some cases, that discussion has long
contained two or more basic methodological orientations, allowing
clearer identification of differences among these orientations and
useful competition among them for "success." For example, the
existence of "rationalist" and "social constructivist" methods in
contemporary political science has been highly valuable in
structuring discussion and providing insights into the potentials
and pitfalls of each.' 5
The external function of a central methodological discussion
has many facets, but at its core it gives the field or discipline an
identity. In doing so, it creates cognitive "hooks" for those outside
the field - i.e., it gives meaning to the label used to refer to the
people who use the method. This tends to heighten the
14. For discussion of the kinds of influences a central methodological
framework can have, see MELVIN W. REDER, ECONOMICS: THE CULTURE OF A
CONTROVERSIAL SCIENCE (1999).
15. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY (John S.
Dryzek et al. eds., 2006).
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accessibility of the work they do, and it provides a means by which
others can relate their own work to the work performed within the
discipline. In this sense, it tends to heighten the perceived
relevance and importance of the field to those outside it.
B. Method and the Relevance of Comparative Law
Both of these functions can have significant value for
comparative law. Perhaps the most obvious value relates to the
relevance of comparative law as a discipline. As we have noted,
the term "comparative law" is used very loosely - little more than
a term for those who doing something with foreign law. As a
consequence, the field is generally perceived as relatively
amorphous. This means that those outside the field have no
"hook" for understanding what scholars in the field do. In turn, if
they do not consider comparative law to be a discipline with some
type of identifiable contours and status, they are unlikely to
perceive incentives for trying to use comparative law work or for
offering to relate their own work to scholars within the field - e.g.,
through cooperation in research projects.
The development of a central methodological discourse in
comparative law would tend to change this perception of
amorphousness. It would provide a set of reference points for
those looking at the field. The term "comparative law" would
begin to acquire recognizable contours and increased content.
This could occur at the level of the field as a whole or in particular
areas. One might envision, for example, a set of comparative law
discussions about method that focus on the use of public choice
tools in comparing legal systems or on the use of empirical
methods. The discussions would give these efforts a profile and
provide a means for those outside the field to recognize who is
doing what in it. It would thus provide a bridge to other
disciplines because it would allow those outside the field to
identify the contents of the field. Methods can direct, or at least,
influence what people see as issues and how they are likely to deal
with those issues. They therefore allow others to recognize what
they are likely to get if they turn to comparative law for
information, insights, or answers.
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C. Method and the Internal Dynamics of Comparative Law
This type of sustained and focused attention to methodological
improvement could have similar benefits within the comparative
law "community." It would provide an ongoing framework for
relating the work of individual scholars to the work of others who
are pursuing similar lines of inquiry or considering how to pursue
their own projects. In this sense, it can be a platform for
transmitting and thus sharing information about the content of
projects, and it can provide feedback loops for evaluating
experience with particular methodological approaches. It would
also tend to improve the capacity of scholars in the field to achieve
greater transparency in evaluating work within the field. Without
a central methodological discussion, there may be few, if any,
shared reference points for evaluating the work of scholars in the
field. Such effects and benefits can, in turn, create incentives for
scholars to do comparative work. They lower the cost of acquiring
information about who is doing what in the area and increase the
potential for collaboration and mutual enrichment among those
who do such work.
D. Method and Product
Each of the above influences has the potential to improve the
product of the comparative law enterprise - the quality and value
of the work produced by comparative law scholars. Improved
internal dynamics among comparative law scholars could improve
the intellectual tools and enhance the perspectives of comparative
law scholars. The improved transparency that a central
methodological framework can provide should improve incentives
for scholars to develop and seek to satisfy the standards that will
be applied in evaluating their work. It can also spread insights
into the advantages, pitfalls and "know-how" of using specific
comparative law tools, thus providing incentives for producing
better scholarship.
These are all ways of adding value to comparative law
scholarship, but it is important to emphasize that they do not
impose constraints on individual scholars. Discussions of method
in comparative law often elicit comments such as "That will just
limit us. Everybody should do what they want to do." It is
common to assume that methods must be hegemonic and
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constraining. This misunderstands the kind of methodological
discussion envisioned here, which would not in any way constrain
individual scholars in their pursuit of comparative knowledge and
insights. It would not seek to push individual scholars in
particular ways or to discourage them using whatever forms of
comparative analysis they find valuable and insightful. The
project of relating individual efforts to one another in relation to a
goal need not be confining! Quite to the contrary, it is intended to
add to the tools available to comparative law scholars and
disseminate knowledge about how they can best be used and what
consequences should be anticipated from using them
It is also common to hear comments from comparative law
scholars that categorically reject the idea that there can be some
kind of central methodological discussion. The assumption here
seems to be that there are many goals and thus many methods are
necessary. While it is true that comparative analysis can involve
many goals, this does not in itself preclude efforts to develop
methodological propositions and tools that can inform and enrich
comparative law analysis in whatever contexts it might be used.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS: ENGAGED DISTANCE
RATHER THAN ISOLATION?
This brief essay began by identifying elements of an imagined
encounter with complexity science. In that imagined encounter,
we identified reactions of comparative law scholars to a rapidly-
developing science that studies the operations of complex systems.
Legal systems - both traditional and increasingly also on the
transnational level - are complex systems, and thus complexity
science deals directly with issues that are central to comparative
law. Yet, comparative law scholars have paid virtually no
attention to these new analytical tools, and their reactions to the
very idea that this could be relevant have been generally
characterized by distance and even hostility. We have seen that
such reactions are deeply rooted in experiences of "separateness"
among comparative law scholars, perhaps especially in the United
States. They rest on historically-conditioned assumptions about
comparative law as a discipline and, especially, about the
relationships between comparative law and all that is outside of it.
Central to this self-image is the idea that there is no central
method or central methodological discussion in comparative law
128 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:110
and that this is as it should be.
We have also seen, however, that this self-image may have
significant consequences for comparative law and both its
scholarly and practical roles. It may obscure potential
opportunities for comparative law scholars to enrich and perhaps
"improve" their product and to increase the relevance of what they
do. The current widespread perception is that comparative law is
not really a discipline, but just an amorphous group of scholars
who happen to deal with foreign legal systems in some way. One
way of changing that perception may be to develop a sustained
methodological discussion that could give a profile to comparative
law scholarship and allow it to become a field of study whose
contours can be seen, related to and used. In the process it might
also enrich the intellectual product of the comparative law
community.
Comparative law scholars may prefer their current identity,
and identities are not easily altered, but they should at least be
aware of some of the costs that this identity brings with it. In a
globalizing context, the potential value of comparative law
scholarship grows dramatically. Comparative law scholars may
want to reassess the costs of being "unrecognizable" as a discipline
and question whether they really want to miss the opportunities
that a richer methodological discussion could provide.
